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Abstract
Lack of both theoretical cogency and empirical evidence casts doubt on the Ger-
schenkronian paradigm of banking and industrial development. Social, political, and
regulatory environments may shape nancial systems, and institutions may persist be-
yond their usefulness. Central features of universal banking arose late in the German
industrialization, if at all; those that did may not have stemmed from the banks' universal
structure. In focusing on international dierences among nancial systems, traditional
views on the relative benets of universal banking may underestimate both the impact of
non-institutional factors on development experiences and the similarities in the ultimate
eects of disparate systems.
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
Universal banking has long provoked a great deal of interest among economic histori-
ans, particularly in the context of Germany from the beginning of the Second Reich
to the end of the Third. Banks are seen as part and parcel of the industrialization of
many economies, but nowhere more than that of Germany. Likewise, among modern
economists, the German banking system has attracted signicant attention, especially
in connection with questions about the optimal design of nancial and corporate gover-
nance systems. Economics research on modern universal banking understandably reects
current themes in regulatory debates in the United States, negotiations over European
unication, and eorts toward industrial development in many regions of the world. Just
as naturally, but also in contrast, the historical literature tends to focus on the power
and importance of specic individuals and institutions.
Motivating this paper is the sense that economists, historians, and economic histo-
rians all stand to gain from more extensive linking between the theoretical literature
on nancial institutions and the historical literature on the German experience. There-
fore, this paper explores both modern theories and historical studies and, in the process,
ties together a wide range of research on universal banking. Combining the models and
methods of economics and history can raise new questions and help restructure unre-
solved debates about nancial systems and their possible role in economic growth. Thus,
this study also oers an agenda for future research on German universal banking.
The recent theoretical literature emphasizes the role of nancial institutions in re-
solving uncertainty through the revelation and intermediation of information about in-
dividual rms as well as in balancing and diversifying risks that remain even when rms
and potential investors are symmetrically informed. These fundamental tenets of nan-
cial theory provide a framework for new lines of inquiry: for example, whether certain
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types of nancial institutions gather and disseminate information more eectively than
others, whether close ties between rms and banks resolve information asymmetries and
alter rms' decision making, or whether universal banking systems encourage superior
risk management compared with market-oriented systems. The answers to such ques-
tions will illuminate both the historical experience and potentially also the problems of
modern growth and development.
Historical investigation, in turn, oers a long-term view of the evolution of systems
and provides an expansive testing ground for nancial theories. The German case in
particular, because of the signicant systemic changes and repeated shocks its nancial
system has suered over the past 150 years, oers a potential wealth of experience to
inform and help rene theories of nancial system structure and rm decision making.
The paper begins with an overview of the traditional conception of German universal
banking during industrialization (section two) and then moves to a discussion of recent
work on nancial intermediation and related theoretical literature (section three). The
fourth section poses new lines of research based both on restructuring traditional debates
around modern banking and nance theory and raising new questions not often addressed
in the previous literature. The paper argues that social, political, and regulatory environ-
ments may play key roles in shaping nancial systems and that institutions may become
entrenched and outlive their usefulness. Moreover, the paper suggests that many of the
purportedly benecial practices of the German banks took place only to a limited extent
during industrialization; and those that did may have had little to do with the banks'
universal structure. The paper concludes that in focusing on international dierences
among nancial systems, widely-held beliefs about the relative benets of German-style
universal banking may underestimate both the impact of non-institutional factors on
development experiences and the similarities in the ultimate eects of disparate systems.
II. TRADITIONAL VIEWS ON GERMAN UNIVERSAL BANKING
BEFORE WORLD WAR I
This section sets out the orthodox view on the role of the universal banks in German
industrial development between 1870 and 1914. Rather than review the development
of institutional structure, and the possible legal impetuses for such change, this paper
focuses on the presumed economic eects of the universal structure and accompanying
corporate governance practices.
1
Issues of timing and institutional change are important
and receive attention in the latter two parts of the section. These subsections sketch the
principle debates that punctuate the historical literature and raise some logical inconsis-
tencies and empirical problems with the traditional lines of research. It is unclear just
how widespread the orthodox view of German banking and industrialization remains:
traditional views persist in recent research in the area, though signicant reevaluations
also appear.
1
For outlines of historical developments and changing organization, see Tilly (1967), Fohlin (1994),
Hauswald (1995), and DaRin (1995).
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A. The Gerschenkron-inspired paradigm
Universal banks have been acknowledged since the nineteenth century for the part they
played in Germany's industrialization. Many authors have written on the subject; but
Gerschenkron's work, perhaps because of its simplication of the myriad complex issues,
has appealed to a particularly wide range of economists and historians, especially in the
United States and Great Britain. Though many speak of the `Gerschenkron Hypothesis,'
however, such an hypothesis is dicult to pinpoint or operationalize.
In part, the so-called Gerschenkron hypothesis holds that the role of nancial in-
stitutions in industrialization relates to the extent of `economic backwardness' on the
eve of industrial takeo.
2
According to his schema, nancial institutions played a crit-
ical role in the industrialization of `moderately backward' economies|meaning much
of northwestern continental Europe. In situations of extreme underdevelopment, as in
Russia, nancial institutions were insucient to support the transition to modernized
industrial activity. Such cases demanded supplementary, centralized institutional inter-
vention, mostly from government.
But the importance of nancial institutions comprises only part of Gerschenkron's
overall thesis; he saw banking as one factor in many that varied with general economic
conditions. Gerschenkron (1970) summarized those conditions thus: \what was found
to vary in direct relation to the degree of backwardness were: 1) the speed of industrial
growth; 2) the stress on bigness of plant and enterprise; 3) the composition of the nascent
output, that is, the degree to which 'heavy' industries were favored; 4) the reliance on
technological borrowing and perhaps nancial assistance from abroad; 5) the pressure on
levels of consumption; 6) the passive role of agriculture; 7) the role of banks and state
budgets; 8) the virulence of ideologies, under the auspices of which the industrialization
proceeded."
3
Because of its ability to adopt technologies developed in already-industrialized Britain,
Germany is argued to have arrived faster at modernization than had its role model. Yet
the scale of factories and rms needed to compete was so large as to require investment
from beyond the typical entrepreneur's circle of family and associates. This relative
capital shortage is thought to have necessitated institutions capable of mobilizing a high
volume of resources from disparate sources and also able to compensate for a shortage of
entrepreneurship. The universal banks are traditionally viewed as just such an institution:
\The German investment banks a powerful invention, comparable in economic ef-
fect to that of the steam engine were in their capital-supplying functions a substitute
for the insuciency of the previously created wealth willingly placed at the disposal of
entrepreneurs. But they were also a substitute for entrepreneurial deciencies."
4
2
Gerschenkron (1962, 1970). Sylla (1991) gives a nice retrospective on Gerschenkron's theories and
some related work.
3
Gerschenkron (1970), p. 98-9.
4
Gerschenkron (1968), p. 137, cited in Collins (1998).
3
Though only one piece of his overall paradigm, Gerschenkron clearly depicts the
universal banks as an intricate part of the industrialization process; and he is not alone.
Many economic historians believe that the universal banks provided the underpinnings,
and were even a necessary and sucient condition, for the German industrialization.
Qualications of the role of the banks have been surfacing for some time, yet the consensus
remains on the side of the banks.
5
The orthodox view of universal banking, whether truly
attributable to Gerschenkron or not, credits these institutions with contributing in many
ways to the growth of German industry. At the most fundamental level, the universal
banks are thought to have mobilized the nancial resources that made industrialization
possible. As Chandler explains, \...these banks provided initial capital for new industrial
ventures and helped guide them through their early years of growth...They supplied much
of what today would be called venture capital.\
6
Such views largely originate in the literature of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, for example in the well-known writings of Werner Sombart: \Doubtless, a
good portion of the increase in economic life in Germany is attributable to this interest
of the banks and bankers in productive, economic activities. The banks have become
the direct promoters of the spirit of enterprise, the pacemakers for industry and trade."
7
The sentiment of Sombart (1909) was widely shared by his contemporaries and nds
continued support among modern economists and historians.
Kennedy (1987) exemplies such thinking: \Germany and America were compen-
sated for their deciencies in short-term and high-grade securities markets, however, by
a superior ability to concentrate resources in areas strategic for rapid development at
moments crucial to the evolution of new products and techniques...The German bank-
ing system, therefore, provided much more elaborate formal facilities for concentrating
nancial resources than either the U.S. or British counterparts."
8
He goes on to attribute
apparently superior growth performance in Germany (and the U.S.) to dierences in
nancial structure: \...capital markets in the U.S. and Germany, by making resources
available to a large group of technologically progressive industries on a scale unequaled in
Britain, account for much of the dierence in the economic growth performance between
those two countries and Britain in the half century after 1865."
9
Similar views on German banking also emerged much earlier. Thus, Lavington (1921)
stressed screening, monitoring, risk management, venture capital activities and economies
of scale and scope: \An organization of this kind, intermediate between the sources of
enterprise and the sources of capital, must evidently possess machinery for investigating
business ventures, nancial strength adequate to sustain the heavy risks to which it is
5
See, for example, Calomiris (1995) or Tilly (1994). Subsequent sections discuss ongoing debates and
doubts further.
6
Chandler (1990), p. 417-419.
7
Sombart (1909), p. 203, author's translation. For a thorough bibliography of contemporary liter-
ature, primarily in German, see Riesser (1910 [German original], 1911[English translation]). Whale's
(1930) bibliography is a useful supplement and covers later works.
8
Kennedy (1987), p. 116. See also Chandler (1990), p. 417-419.
9
Kennedy (1987), p. 120.
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exposed and the reputation and business connexions necessary for the ecient sale of
securities to the public. An organization such as the Deutsche Bank possesses these
qualities to a high degree...It is easy to see that, with able management and machinery
of this kind, the risks of industrial banking are greatly reduced; business ventures in need
of capital can be thoroughly investigated and the development of the more pioneering
enterprises may be promoted with a reasonable prospect of success."
10
The German banks are thought to have developed special characteristics that in
part emulated but that also inspired nancial systems of neighboring countries. Such
institutional features involved both the structure of the banks and the policies pursued
by them. The orthodox paradigm, albeit not always in these terms, credits the universal
banks with mobilizing capital through large networks of branches, screening potential
entrepreneurs, promoting and re-organizing whole industries, deciding on investment
and production strategies, monitoring the progress of clients' investments, arranging and
enforcing propitious industrial combinations, and diversifying away the risk associated
with such innovative activities.
The universal banks' combination of the full range of nancial services is thought by
many to have given German bankers advantages in providing substantial and ecient
nance throughout rms' lives. Such eciency has been argued in turn to have reduced
the costs of nance and thus promoted industrial investment.
11
In a related vein, the
German banks have been credited with promoting ecient allocation of the economy's
investment portfolio, particularly in comparison with Britain.
12
Eciency gains hinge not just on the reusability of information but on its quality as
well. Thus, close, long-term relationships between banks and industrial rms are seen
as central to the banks' acquisition and transfer of useful information{not just nancial,
but also strategic and entrepreneurial. Moreover, the banks are thought to have gained
signicant say in the use of funds, and thus the types of investments made by rms.
Such involvement and oversight is argued to have reduced banks' uncertainty about
borrowers, mitigated risks of moral hazard or simple bad judgement, and facilitated
long-term lending. Long-term bank lending usually took the form of short-term credits
on current account that were rolled over repeatedly. Pollard and Ziegler (1992) sum up
the widely-accepted view \that the rolling short-term credit, perpetually renewed, could
be the equivalent of long-term capital, or could be used to free the rm's resources for
long-term investments."
13
10
Lavington (1921), p. 210.
11
Economies of scope is a modern interpretation of the traditional accounts. Calomiris (1995), for
example, advances such an argument and has argued that German companies faced lower costs of
issuing new equity compared with their American counterparts. Tilly (1994) produces similar gures for
Germany.
12
This research, Tilly (1986) and Kennedy and Britton (1985), is discussed subsequently at greater
length.
13
Pollard and Ziegler (1992), p. 21.
5
Formalized relationships between banks and rms, perhaps even more than universal
banking functions themselves, attracts ample praise in the historical literature. Ger-
schenkron, among others, claimed that \the German banks, and with them the Austrian
and Italian banks, established the closest possible relations with industrial enterprises."
14
Formal ties between banks and rms were established and maintained through placement
of bank representatives on rms' supervisory boards (Aufsichtsrat).
15
Jeidels (1905) claimed that \...the power of the Great Banks is exercised via the
legal institution of the supervisory board, rather than through direct inuence of nan-
cial strength."
16
Gerschenkron echoed Jeidels, saying that \...through development of
the institution of the supervisory boards to the position of most powerful organs within
corporate organizations, the banks acquired a formidable degree of ascendancy over in-
dustrial enterprises, which extended far beyond the sphere of nancial control into that
of entrepreneurial and managerial decisions."
17
Thus, bank seats on supervisory boards are traditionally thought to have permitted
not just oversight, but also direct control, over rms' operations and decisions. Chandler
(1991) notes, \The representatives of the German Grossbanken participated to a greater
extent in the top-level decision-making of new industrial companies than did representa-
tives of nancial institutions in the United States and Britain." He goes on to report that
\...the banks often had a signicant say (particularly in the early years of a company's
history) in investment decisions, in the selection of top and even middle managers, in es-
tablishing administrative procedures, and in reviewing the internal nancial management
of the enterprises that they had helped to nance."
For individual rms and whole industries, bank intervention is seen as improving op-
erational eciency, managerial organization, and, ultimately, protability. In this con-
nection, the universal banks are often also characterized as marriage brokers: identifying
advantageous combinations, in the form of cartels or mergers. As Feldenkirchen (1991)
describes, noting the diculty of enforcing output and pricing agreements during the
1880's, \the banks, with the Disconto-Gesellschaft in the lead, promoted the expansion
of big enterprises such as the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks AG and the Harpener Bergbau
AG, expecting to achieve their aims more easily once industrial concentration had taken
place."
18
14
Gerschenkron (1962), p. 14. Jeidels (1905), Riesser (1910), Schumpeter (1930), Wallich (1905),
Whale (1930), Tilly (1994), Chandler (1990), and most others writing on the subject, also emphasize
this point.
15
German joint-stock rms are governed by two boards. The supervisory board is elected by and rep-
resents shareholders and also appoints the rm's executive board. The latter, comprising rm managers,
oversees day-to-day operations. Most other types of companies are not required to have a supervisory
board.
16
Jeidels (1905), p. 145, author's translation. The Great Banks were the 9 largest of the uni-
versal banks: Bank fur Handel und Industrie, Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, Commerz- und Disconto-
bank, Deutsche Bank, Discontogesellschaft, Dresdner Bank, Mitteldeutsche Creditbank, Nationalbank
fr Deutschland, and A. Schaahausen'scher Bankverein.
17
Gerschenkron (1962).
18
Feldenkirchen (1991), p. 127 and references cited there.
6
One further advantage often attributed to the universal banking system, and to formal
bank-rm relationships in particular, is the willingness of bankers to help rms solve
idiosyncratic diculties and ride out general downturns. Feldenkirchen (1991) gives
the example of Hoerder Bergwerks-und Huttenverein, which, because of its exclusive
relationship with the Schaahausen'schen Bankverein (and the private banker Deichmann
& Co.), received crucial restructuring and survived a brush with bankruptcy.
19
More
generally, the conventional view of German universal banking emphasizes the cradle-to-
grave relationships between banks and rms and the benecial mutual commitment that
resulted. Jeidels (1905) commented, from the banks' perspective, that it was \in the
interest of the security, protability, and longevity of a credit institution to provide for
all of the credit needs of a rm, from its formation to its liquidation."
20
Thus, taken in its entirety, the traditional paradigm holds that universal banking ac-
tivities and accompanying formalized bank-rm relationships raised the quantity, quality,
and eciency of investment in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the start of
the twentieth. Inherent in this view of German nance and industrialization is a compar-
ison with other countries, and Britain attracts particular attention. England, being seen
as the rst European country to industrialize, constitutes the metric by which other ex-
periences are measured. In the Gerschenkronian account, British industrial development
proceeded in a gradual enough manner, and innovations required small enough infusions
of capital, that entrepreneurs depended little on external nancing from banks.
21
The
standard view of banking and industrialization, then, distinguishes sharply between the
British and German experiences.
There is a second part to the Anglo-German comparison; involving the relative success
of the two banking systems in promoting industrial growth at the end of the nineteenth
century and the start of the twentieth. Though such notions are currently debated,
Britain is traditionally thought to have lost ground relative to its continental neighbors
at the turn of the century, and this relative slowdown is often attributed to a failure to in-
novate and invest at the forefront of technology. Noting Germany's signicant advantage
over Britain in world exports of chemicals, electrical equipment, and industrial machin-
ery, Chandler concludes, \these gures emphasize that although Britain was holding its
own in traditional industrial goods and materials, textiles, iron shapes, iron ships, and
steam engines Germany had decisively outpaced Britain in producing and exporting the
products of the Second Industrial Revolution."
22
The British nancial system has received harsh and repeated criticism for much of
the past century, and much of what is seen as the decline of the British economy has
19
Feldenkirchen (1991), p. 127.
20
Jeidels (1905), p. 63, author's translation. See also Gerschenkron (1962) and, for a modern restate-
ment, Mayer (1988).
21
Some question the standard view. See, for example, Cottrell (1980), Mathias (1973, 1989), and
Cameron (1967, 1972).
22
Chandler (1990), p. 410-11. See this same work for in-depth discussion of British, American,
and German forms of industrial organization. On relative productivity of Britain and Germany, see
Broadberry (1997).
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been blamed on the failure of nancial institutions. British industry is thought to have
been constrained by a lack of capital; the banks, it is argued, could have, but refused to,
provide necessary nance to industry. Many have chastised the British banks for avoiding
engagement with domestic industry and leaving rms to nd nance from other sources.
The banks' involvement in foreign and imperial ventures is claimed to have drained away
funds from domestic industry; rms' resultant recourse to securities markets is argued to
have advanced investors' short-term prot motives at the expense of long-term growth.
23
Thus, the German banks are thought not only to have engaged in all of the activ-
ities seen as central to the promotion of economic growth, but to have executed these
functions more eectively and eciently than the British banks. In echoing the common
perception that the British banks and securities markets heavily favored short-term and
gilt-edged instruments, Kennedy (1987) attributes the lack of long-term lending and ven-
ture capital to the `informational weaknesses' of the British system. In a paper previously
mentioned, Kennedy and Britton argued moreover that the German system's superior
risk diversication placed that country closer to its ecient portfolio frontier compared
to Britain. Kennedy concludes that \What was unique in Britain was not the existence
of imperfect sharing of risk and control among those with a stake in corporate ventures
but rather the unusually slow development of recognition of the extent of the problem
and of eective means to rectify it."
24
Yet more recent research has begun to undermine the sharp distinction between the
operations of the British deposit banks and the German universal banks, particularly in
the realm of commercial lending. Collins (1998), for example, argues convincingly that
the English banks oered much more long-term nance through rolled over credits than
previously thought and suggests that the English banks discriminated less among cus-
tomers compared to the lending practices of bank-industry groups (Konzern) in Germany.
Moreover, it seems that British bankers did provide signicant oversight functions and
also aided distressed rms with which the banks maintained long-term relationships.
25
Nonetheless, a signicant contingent still holds that the British system promoted short-
termism and less ecient distributions of risk compared to Germany.
26
B. Traditional areas of debate in the historical literature
The orthodox view of banking and industrial development, though enduring, has not
gone unchallenged. Indeed, the German universal banks, since their origination in the
middle of the nineteenth century, have engendered copious discussion and debate among
academics, practitioners, and politicians. Strong views of both positive and negative
sorts persist.
23
For a review of the literature on British banking and industrial development, see Michael Collins
(1991, 1998). Also see Forrest Capie and Collins (1992). For a critical appraisal of the British banking
system, see George Edwards (1987).
24
Kennedy (1987), p. 127.
25
Watson (1995) also argues, based on nancing of the beer brewing industry, that criticism of the
British banks is exaggerated.
26
This position is stated in Tilly (1994), p. 4.
8
Recent work challenges Gerschenkron's hypothesis at the broadest level. The ortho-
dox view, as it is now recognized, underemphasizes the role of political and legal factors
in the development of nancial systems. As Tilly (1994) notes, the Bubble Act of 1720
and the monopoly of the Bank of England over limited liability banking until 1825 kept
the British banks smaller and more conservative than they likely would have been based
only on demands for industrial nance. Moreover, the lack of dependable lender of last
resort facilities reenforced the reluctance of bankers to engage in risky transformation of
short-term liabilities to potentially illiquid assets (Ziegler, 1993, Kennedy, 1992). The
German Reichsbank, in contrast, both squeezed other banks out of much of the short-
term commercial business and facilitated those banks' provision of riskier investment
services. Moreover, regulation of securities markets and joint-stock companies seems to
have encouraged the dependence on and expansion of the universal banking system in
Germany.
Verdier (1997) generalizes such critiques and takes direct aim at Gerschenkron's hy-
pothesis about the relationship between the extent of economic backwardness and the
role of nancial institutions. He argues that political structure, not relative backward-
ness, determines the shape of nancial systems. As Verdier concedes, though, political
centralization was neither solitary nor decisive in determining nancial structure in most
cases. Furthermore, political structure is not clearly independent of economic backward-
ness, and the two factors may be mutually enhancing, rather than mutually exclusive.
Thus, the Verdier thesis, whether it correctly characterizes the relationship between po-
litical and nancial development, does not clearly subvert Gerschenkron's hypothesis.
Nonetheless, this line of work raises the potential importance of political and legal fac-
tors in inuencing the link between nancial structure and economic progress.
27
Most debates in this area focus more directly on the connection between nancial
institutions and industrial development. In this vein, perhaps most damaging to the
orthodox view of universal banking's role in the industrialization of continental Europe
is the criticism that this form of banking often developed after the rst push of indus-
trialization. This point may be particularly serious for the German case. Since German
state governments tightly restricted the formation of joint-stock companies until 1870,
few companies organized themselves under this form during the rst wave of industrial-
ization in the late 1830s and 1840s or even during the rst big push of heavy industry
in the Ruhr (1850s).
28
Moreover, the rst joint-stock universal banks arose in 1848 and
then in the 1850s, so that they could not have played any role in the signicant steps
toward industrialization taken in the rst half of the nineteenth century.
29
To counter the anachronism critique, researchers have pointed to Tilly's (1966, 1967,
1986) work showing that the private bankers of the Rhineland began to develop uni-
27
For more on legal issues, see the edited volume by Horn and Kocka (1979) especially those by Horn,
Friedrich, and Reich.
28
See Boesselman (1939) and Thieme (1960) on joint-stock companies in Germany.
29
Cameron (1972) and Edwards and Ogilvie (1996) make the more general point about the timing of
industrialization and the development of joint-stock banking.
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versal banking techniques as early as the 1830s. The activities and involvement of pri-
vate bankers varied considerably, however, with most concentrating their resources on
government nance and safer investments.
30
As Feldenkirchen notes, German nancial
institutions developed slowly: \Indeed in hardly any other eld of the German economy
in the mid-1850s was there such a general degree of backwardness as in the banking
sector."
31
Thus, it appears that much of the nancing of the rst wave of industrializa-
tion owed, not through universal nancial intermediaries, but from the personal savings
of entrepreneurs, their families and friends.
32
The debate over the timing of industrialization and the development of the bank-
ing sector raises another potential problem for the Gerschenkron school: geographic and
sectoral heterogeneity within Germany. The orthodox view of German industrializa-
tion derives largely from the experiences of the Rhineland and Westphalia and of heavy
industry and, much later, electro-technicals. It is thought that the rst wave of industri-
alization sprang largely from the advent of railroads; and investment in this sector is seen
as producing growth-enhancing spillovers in input sectors (mining and metal products)
as well as in industries that could benet from improved transport. Railroad companies
themselves soaked up almost three quarters of all capital invested in Prussian joint-stock
companies prior to 1870.
33
While banks played a signicant role in early railroad -
nancing in parts of Prussia and Saxony, however, state governments nanced the vast
majority of such investment in other areas.
34
Furthermore, industrial production began much earlier in Germany than the stan-
dard view supposes; and much of the industrial growth of the rst half of the nineteenth
century derived from small- and medium-sized producers in metal working, textiles, and
other light industries.
35
Such industries spread throughout what became the pre-World
War I German Empire, while mining naturally concentrated in a narrow swath of middle-
Germany: primarily the Ruhr, Saxony, and Silesia (now part of Poland). In many regions,
small-scale industry was tied closely to agriculture, and factory production evolved only
slowly.
36
Clearly, industrial development varied considerably among the German regions,
but proponents of the orthodox view might insist that the universal banks and their prin-
ciple clientele comprised such a crucial segment of the economy that they still provided
the underpinnings of the industrial revolution: in Kindleberger's view, that \the great
30
See Kocka (1978), Donaubauer (1988), as well as studies cited in those works.
31
Feldenkirchen (1991), p. 119.
32
Kocka (1978), p. 538.
33
Figures estimated by Tilly (1976), p. 588. But, of course, joint stock capital grew much faster after
1870 than before.
34
Borchardt (1968) estimates government investments at nearly three quarters of railroad nance
before 1850.
35
See Fischer (1968) and Hans Pohl (1986).
36
On regional dierences, see Herrigel (1996) and the many case studies cited there. Fremdling and
Tilly (1979) and the paper by Megerle in that volume are particularly informative. For a more general
view of regional dierences in Europe, see Pollard (1979).
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banks constituted less than a tenth of the total assets of nancial institutions...but were
found at the critical margin aecting economic growth."
37
Yet the focus of the universal banks on a narrow range of industries has also prompted
debate over the overall eects of the banks on economic growth and the suggestion that
this eect, contrary to Kindleberger's intention, may actually have been unfavorable.
Indeed, in an econometric model of the German macroeconomy between 1883 and 1913,
Neuberger and Stokes (1974) found a negative relationship between the extent of bank
current account lending and German economic growth. The paper sparked some contro-
versy, and debates over its methodology ended without a rm conclusion for or against
the growth distortion hypothesis.
38
Debates have spread even to the orthodox views of relations between large rms and
banks in the later stages of industrialization. One part of the traditional paradigm holds
that the universal banks exploited their positions of power to manipulate and control
industrial rms to the banks' advantage.
39
As Tilly (1994) concludes, \the `facts' of
nancial control of industry also seem clear. That investment and mixed banks of the
Belgian, French or German and Austrian type consciously and actively pursued the goal
of controlling the railroads and industrial enterprises they nanced is documented in
hundreds of individual episodes."
40
Opponents denounce the universal banks for wielding excessive power over indus-
trial enterprises and using their positions to enforce unwanted takeovers and collusive
agreements. These same traditions of control, however, because they forced the ratio-
nalization of industrial structure, are seen in some quarters as a benet of German-style
banking. As James describes, Gerschenkron claimed that the banks \used their inuence
on supervisory boards (Aufsichtsrate) to inuence rms' policies and especially to regu-
late competition and promote cartels and mergers."
41
The newer consensus opinion now
seems to hold that the banks were losing their grip on industry by 1900. Yet this is just
when the concentration movement was gathering steam in Germany. Thus, it is dicult
to reconcile the idea of bank manipulation of industrial structure with the actual timing
of events.
Moreover, researchers have uncovered little evidence in support of the bank-power hy-
pothesis for the pre-war period. Critics refer to the mining and smelting concern Phoenix,
a company thought to have been forced into cartelization and merger by bankers sitting
on the company supervisory board, as a prime example of bank power.
42
Wellhoner's
(1989) recent research, however, overturns the standard view with respect to the Phoenix
37
Kindleberger (1984), p. 129, quoted in Edwards and Ogilvie (1996). So far, no general evidence
exists to support Kindleberger's claim.
38
See Fremdling and Tilly (1976) and Komlos (1978).
39
Hilferding (1910) energetically promoted such an idea.
40
Tilly (1994), p. 4, citing also Cameron (1961), Levy-Leboyer (1964), Tilly (1966), Marz (1968),
Kocka (1978), and Pohl (1982).
41
James (1992), p. 263.
42
See Feldenkirchen (1979) and Kunze (1926). Both are cited in Wellhoner (1989).
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case and casts doubt on the bank dominance hypothesis for heavy industry more gener-
ally.
Though bankers did use their votes on the Phoenix supervisory board to force the
company into the Steelworks Association (Stahlwerksverband) against the wishes of the
rms' top managers, the banks did so under pressure from other rms in the Association.
The banks, one of which was a great bank, acted as a lever for the competitors of Phoenix
with the powerful industrialist Thyssen in the lead. Similar events surrounded the fusion
of Phoenix with a number of other mining and metal rms in the decade before World
War I.
43
Feldman's work also demonstrates that industrialists, notably Hugo Stinnes, played
a major role in initiating mergers and acquisitions and even had to pull the bankers
together at times.
44
Banks may have attempted to use their positions to extract rents
from their clients, but industrialists could often ght back and exert their independence.
Indeed, in many cases, it seems the banks' primary motivation lay in their competition
with one another. A telling example may be Stinnes' attempts to secure nancing for the
acquisition of Dortmunder Union by his rm, Deutsch-Luxemburg, in 1910. The chief
diculty seems to have been the banks' haggling with one another over their shares in
the underwriting consortium. Feldman (1997) quotes from Stinnes' wife's diary: \Hugo
tries to get the D-Banks under one roof with regard to the fusion of the Union and
Deutsch-Luxemburg, so far without success, even if they are coming closer. No one is
willing to allow the other a little bit more. Schoeller does not want to let himself be put
into a minority by the others, while the Deutsche and Dresdner Banks believe that the
Disconto is making too much on the business anyway."
45
Wessel (1990) and Broder and Wengenroth (1991) also support the idea that bank
power was waning (at least in the steel industry), and that especially large rms were
largely independent of the universal banks, well before 1900.
46
Most of the research on
bank power has focused on the mining and steel sectors, and probably for good reason.
If bank power was exerted through their positions on rm supervisory boards, then it
is clear that the inuence of the largest banks was conned primarily to the mining,
transport, and electro-technical industries.
47
Moreover, since there were few joint-stock
companies to control before 1870, and since half of the great banks were founded after
1870, it seems that the era of bank domination if it ever existed lasted only two decades.
43
Welloner (1989), pp. 83-87.
44
See Feldman (1997), p. 7.
45
Feldman (1997), pp. 7-8, quoting Stinnes' wife's diary of August 6, 1910. See also Feldman (1998,
forthcoming). The D-banks were the four largest great banks: Discontogesellschaft and Dresdner,
Deutsche, and Darmstadter Banks.
46
See also Wengenroth's (1986) comparative study of technological progress and strategy in the British
and German steel industry from 1865 to 1895.
47
Fohlin (1997a) gives the sectoral breakdown of all kinds of bank board positions, and of interlocking
directorates more generally, for a random sample of all joint-stock companies in Germany as of 1905.
Sombart (1909) reports on all seats of the great banks the ndings are also summarized in Fohlin (1997a).
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Certainly between the largest banks and rms, power owed in both directions. Yet
this line of historical research has not yet determined how well these prominent coun-
terexamples to claims of bank power generalize to the larger population. Thus, while
the traditional views clearly overstate the imbalance between banks and rms, more re-
search is needed to determine the extent of bank inuence more broadly. If the paradigm
ts poorly in the heavy industrial sectors, though, it probably ts even less well among
the sectors that were paid little attention by the great banks. Provincial banks cov-
ered much of the geographical and industrial territory ignored by the big Berlin banks,
however, and researchers have tended to neglect that segment of the banking sector.
Nonetheless, Kocka's conclusion, that \the banks acted like large ywheels; they did not
initiate most changes, but, rather, reected and strengthened existing trends," so far
seems warranted.
48
C. Diculties in the Gerschenkron-inspired paradigm
Existing debates over universal banking, though certainly of importance, have not usu-
ally been structured in a manner that allows us to draw general principles or lessons from
them. With this goal in mind, the traditional literature would benet from greater atten-
tion to a number of areas: achieving theoretical cogency, constructing useful methodolog-
ical specications, gathering sucient evidence, and amending persistent anachronisms.
Future research probably can fully resolve most of these diculties, though there will
always exist limits to the availability of certain desirable data. This subsection sets
out some of the general problems; more specic discussions of the available quantitative
studies and suggestions for future work appear in the nal section of the paper.
Gerschenkron is a sensible place to begin. From the perspective of generalization, a
signicant problem with Gerschenkron's hypothesis is the specicity of the theory to a
narrow range of cases and limited empirical support. His views on the German case, in
particular, come in large part from his own observations of the way in which banking
seemed to operate. As Sylla (1992) aptly describes, Gerschenkron's experiences growing
up in inter-war Vienna colored his view of banking and industrialization. For example,
Gerschenkron reminded his readers that \[he had] had a close personal opportunity of
watching how, in the 1920s, the representatives of the Credit Anstalt appeared weekly at
two machinery factories in a little industrial town near Vienna. They participated most
intimately not just in all entrepreneurial decisions, but in many managerial decisions,
and their word was received as command by the directors of the two rms."
49
There are several obvious reasons why Gerschenkron's personal experiences may prove
insucient for understanding Austrian industrialization, much less that of Germany and
the rest of continental Europe. First, the observations he made on a small number of
companies may not t more generally even in inter-war Austria. Second, the Austrian
experience may not necessarily be generalized to Germany or the rest of Europe. Third,
48
Kocka (1980), p. 92, cited in Herrigel (1996), p. 83. Such a sentiment was expressed much earlier
by Whale (1930) and even to some extent by Riesser (1910, 1911).
49
Gerschenkron (1977), p. 55. Quoted in Sylla (1992), p. 46.
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the 1920s may provide an inaccurate portrait of the pre-World War I experiences in many
cases.
Clearly, Gerschenkron's views on German industrialization did not rely exclusively
on his own observations in inter-war Austria, but he did not avail himself of broad-based
evidence for Germany either. Yet it would be unfair to single out Gerschenkron on this
point. For details of the German case, many authors (apparently including Gerschenkron)
rely on the accounts of such contemporaries of the late industrialization period as Riesser
(1910, 1911), Hilferding (1910), and Jeidels (1905). These authors had even greater stakes
in the debates over universal banking in Germany: Jakob Riesser was a director of one
of the largest universal banks, Otto Jeidels was an employee of another such bank, and
Rudolf Hilferding was a well-known socialist critic of capitalism and the power of the
banks. Perhaps more important than ideological biases, however, these older works are
largely founded on the experiences of a small portion of the economy and a limited period
of time. Such biases become problematic when the resulting works are extrapolated to
the rest of the economy or to earlier time periods.
As a result, Gerschenkron's hypothesis concerning Germany (or the orthodox paradigm
that has developed around it) includes a number of ill-supported notions about what
functions the universal banks performed, when the characteristic features of universal
banking developed, how much inuence the banks had over industry, and the ultimate
eects of the structure of the German nancial system on industrialization and economic
growth. While the fact that Gerschenkron's work rests on little empirical evidence or
analysis does not automatically invalidate his thesis, it does leave his hypotheses open
to revision. The apparent generality and sweep of Gerschenkron's theories on nancial
institutions and industrialization also invite criticism and skepticism.
50
Problems with the earlier historical literature may create diculties for more recent
work, since many assume that the role of nancial institutions is what Gerschenkron and
his followers have argued it was. If the structure and function of nancial institutions does
not t the orthodox view, then the foundation of the Gerschenkron hypothesis is funda-
mentally unstable. In particular, it seems likely that marked changes in the organization
and operations of the German joint-stock banks between 1850 and 1913 mean that these
institutions reached the Gerschenkronian ideal long after the main phases of industrial-
ization, if ever. Recent papers have made some use of theoretical advances in economics
in an attempt to place the historical experience in a more modern framework.
51
Yet,
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Early skepticism emerges in Cameron (1972) and Rudolph's chapter (on Austria) in the same volume.
Tilly's (1967) work on Germany also oers moderation, though he is generally supportive.
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Calomiris (1995), Fohlin (1994), DaRin (1996), and Hauswald (1995) for examples using the newer
theoretical literature on information asymmetry and agency theory. The latter two papers essentially
recast the Gerschenkronian paradigm in modern language. Tilly (1986, 1992, 1994) and Kennedy and
Britton (1985) use the standard CAPM and portfolio theories to test the eciency of the German system
(in comparison with the British). These papers are discussed subsequently.
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because both theoretical and historical studies often rely on the same possibly inaccurate
and often anachronistic accounts, they are equally restricted in their usefulness.
52
The orthodox view of German universal banking stresses the size and structure of
the banks, the involvement of the banks in the formal governance of industrial rms,
and to some extent the eciency of intermediation and diversication provided by the
banks. Less tangible, but equally crucial to this paradigm, are the entrepreneurial spirit,
informal oversight and control, and willingness to take risks that are also attributed to the
directors of the German industrial banks (all of which are usually supported on the basis
of a handful of prominent cases). The fundamental lesson of the historical literature is
that the universal banks were powerful institutions that played an important role at least
in the later stages of the German industrialization. Thus, while institutional structure
is central to widely-held beliefs about German banking, most views of universal banking
in German economic development also hinge crucially on characteristics unrelated to
nancial system organization: culture, time and place, and individual personalities, for
example.
The modern economics literature, however, looks to the historical record for insight
into the consequences of the organization of nancial systems for industrial growth and
development. The existing historical literature therefore may prove insucient for deriv-
ing such economic implications: even if banks did play a crucial role in German indus-
trialization, their eectiveness may not have resulted from their structure as universal
banks. Likewise, perceived failures of other systems the British, for example may be
due to idiosyncratic characteristics. Given the current state of knowledge, therefore, it
may be impossible to replicate the German experience in other contexts or to determine
whether such a goal would be desirable. This problem, in particular, underscores the
need for economic theory in providing testable generalizations that might be used in
understanding modern problems. Theoretical underpinnings can reveal potential aws
in the standard arguments and oer new ways to approach the long-standing questions
and debates about the German experience with universal banking.
The bank power debate is just one example of an historical debate that might benet
from insights of modern theoretical work on banking and nancial contracting as well as
further empirical research. Much historical work focuses on the question of the dominance
of banks over rms with limited reference to the economic eects of that power. Other
work has emphasized the eciency enhancements engendered by the banks' control with
little substantial proof and without theoretical justication of the need for formal bank
relationships in the process of rationalization. In order to understand the economic
importance of bank power, one needs to draw a connection between bank control and
systematic dierences in rms' behavior and outcomes.
53
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This issue receives further attention in the nal section of the paper, which discusses recent reeval-
uations of the historical record.
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Tilly (1994), p. 104, also makes this point: \[this literature] has only rarely made use of economic
theory, which thus limits the generalizations which can be made from it." Baskin and Miranti (1997) also
argue for the use of theory in interpreting the evolution of nancial institutions and corporate nance
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III. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON UNIVERSAL BANKING
A. The central characteristics of universal banking
Universal banking is often discussed as if it were a well-dened and static principle. In
reality, the concept of universal banking has evolved gradually over time and the practices
associated with this style of banking have also changed. Benston (1994, p.121) is not
alone in claiming that, \Germany today and before the second World War oers the best
example of universal banking." Similar nancial institutions certainly existed in other
continental European countries, but German banks seem to have led the way and have
become synonymous with the term universal banks.
As Tilly (1992) and others have made clear, the forerunners of German universal
banking arose in the middle of the nineteenth century. The primordial universal bankers
of the 1840's and 50's, however, were private banks that bore little resemblance to the
twentieth century universal bank. Even ignoring the question of demand for industrial
nance at the time, strict regulations on incorporation and limited liability likely limited
both the possibility of externally nanced banks and the potential clientele for universal
banking services. By the formation of the German Empire in 1871, after much relax-
ation of corporate regulations and a strong wave of industrialization, the universal banks
had become organized under the joint-stock form and were unregulated except by the
general laws applying to German share companies (Aktiengesellschaften or Kommandit-
gesellschaften auf Aktien). It is really from this point that the German universal banks
began to take on their modern form.
The most fundamental characteristic of universal banking is the joint provision of a
wide range of nancial services by the same institution. Universal banks are, thus, the
supermarkets of corporate nance. Since true universal banks are allowed to provide
virtually any product, the term is often dened in terms of the services that commercial
banks in the US, for most of this century, have not been permitted to oer. Specically,
universal banks typically combine traditional commercial banking functions (short-term
credit, deposit taking, payments clearing, bill discounting) with underwriting and trading
in securities. Modern universal banks also sell insurance, mortgages, and investment
funds, though they usually do so through aliates.
Additional practices have become identied with universal banking, mainly because
they frequently coincide with the principal traits of this style of nance. Examples include
branching over extensive geographic areas, holding securities of client rms, voting shares
in proxy for customers, and sitting on the boards of directors of client rms. These
operations are also out of bounds for American commercial and investment banks.
Thus, it is useful to delineate two sets of bank characteristics, universal banking and
relationship banking, whose coexistence may oer synergies, but which may in practice
since medieval times. On the other hand, their analysis of the historical record rests on little empirical
evidence.
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exist independently of one another. Universal banking can be dened as the joint pro-
duction of multiple nancial services (investment banking, commercial banking, retail
securities business, mortgage, and insurance). The provision of many services over sev-
eral phases of rms' development may tend to lead to long-term relationships between
rms and nancial institutions, but formalized relationships depend on a further set of
activities. Relationship banking can be viewed as a separate category involving prac-
tices related to the ownership and control of rms (long-term debt and equity stakes,
proxy voting of shares, and interlocking directorates between banks and rms). Not all
universal banks perform the complete range of allowable functions, and not all nancial
institutions that provide some of these functions are universal banks.
History oers a number of examples. Japanese banks have at times operated as uni-
versal banks while being prohibited from holding equity stakes and board positions in
underwritten rms; they have also been permitted to engage in interlocking directorates
with industry while being restricted in the scope of their nancing services. Likewise,
banks in the US were permitted to combine investment and commercial banking until
the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933; though interlocking directorates had been
progressively restrained at the turn of the twentieth century and then essentially prohib-
ited by the Clayton Act in 1914. Furthermore, not all specialized or arms-length systems
result from prohibitions on universal or relationship banking: British commercial banks,
for example, have always been permitted to engage in universal and relationship banking,
but have apparently often refrained.
The question of branching, though often appearing in discussions of universal banking,
is really a separate issue. While the practicality of universal banking may hinge on size,
it is not clear that branching is a necessary condition. Indeed, the rst universal banks
were unit banks, and those in Germany operated as such for decades before beginning to
branch. Moreover, since the principal benet of geographic dispersion is diversication
potential, branching may be equally benecial to specialized banks.
B. The modern view of nancial intermediation
There is little debate over the actual practices of universal banks, at least not for most
of the twentieth century, but there is signicant disagreement over interpreting the mo-
tivation and impact of these functions in the context of modern theories of corporate
nance and current debates over the optimal structure of nancial systems. In order to
understand the theoretical implications of universal banking, it is useful rst to place
these institutions in the more general context of nancial intermediation.
Existence and functions of intermediaries
The fundamental role of nancial institutions is to intermediate between the sources and
uses of nancial capital in the economy; they can do so with or without changing the qual-
ities of the assets involved. These two types of intermediation, brokerage and qualitative
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asset transformation (QAT) form the core of banks' activities. Financial intermediaries
arise because they can provide such services at lower cost than can individual savers and
borrowers.
54
In some cases, the limitation on investment is the lack of information about opportu-
nities: those holding wealth are often unacquainted with those in need of funds. Much
as a real-estate agent facilitates the transfer of property, a nancial intermediary can
act as a broker simply by providing an easily identiable place for buyers and sellers to
transact. This service lowers transactions costs and broadens the accessibility of nance,
thus raising the quantity of capital available.
The work of intermediaries also involves changing the characteristics of nancial
claims. Individuals use their wealth to buy deposits at nancial institutions, and those
institutions invest the funds in a wide range of projects. In many cases, the deposit con-
tract has a maturity and liquidity that is dierent from the loans or other assets that are
created. Liquidity and maturity transformation therefore stem from the variation in the
requirements of debtors and creditors. Relative to deposits or cash, capital investment is
assumed to yield higher average per-period returns, but requires a longer time horizon to
pay o. Assets are best invested in capital if they are not needed for a signicant period
of time, but should be held in more liquid form if they may be needed on short notice.
The diculty is that wealth holders typically are unlikely to know with certainty the
timing of their cash needs over their lifetimes; thus, intermediaries can pool deposits and
invest in an asset portfolio that reects the expected distribution of future demands for
liquidity. By mobilizing resources that would otherwise sit idle in wealth holders' mat-
tresses, nancial intermediaries expand the quantity of assets available to entrepreneurs.
By investing in a range of projects, nancial institutions also diversify the portfolio of
depositors.
Much of the intermediary's theoretical cost advantage over individual investors stems
from problems of asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and their potential
sources of nance. Incomplete or imperfect information may open the door for sub-
optimal use of funds or misreporting of returns, that may be most eciently diminished
by a nancial intermediary. Even when information problems have no sinister implica-
tions, the process of intermediation can also help diversify depositors' portfolios. Since
capital investment often requires outlays in substantial denominations, individuals likely
face limits the number of dierent projects to which they can contribute.
Poor information about entrepreneurs' quality, and thus the distribution of potential
pay-os, can lead to the refusal of nancing at any price. If loan applicants cannot be
distinguished from one another, then a single interest rate must be applied to all. Under
certain assumptions about the distributions of project returns, the maximum acceptable
interest rate increases with the riskiness of the borrower, and increases in rates cause
54
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) provide a nice review of the theoretical banking literature up to
the early nineties. Allen and Santomero (1998) oer a critical assessment of traditional theories of
intermediation in light of institutional changes in nancial markets.
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the safest borrowers to exit rst. Thus, when unobservably heterogeneous borrowers are
pooled, it is impossible to nd an interest rate at which all risks are priced properly,
and credit rationing results.
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The need for credit rationing diminishes as the ability to
estimate returns improves. Thus, if those with superior abilities to dierentiate among
potential borrowers become nancial intermediaries, then such institutions may partially
alleviate credit rationing.
The pecking order of nancial instruments
So far, the discussion has not dierentiated among the types of claims that nancial
intermediaries create and trade in the process of nancing investment. In a tax-free
world with free markets, perfect competition, and symmetric information the choice
among nancial instruments has little consequence for rms. Under such conditions,
Modigliani and Miller (1958) proved their now well-known proposition that rms cannot
alter the total value of their securities by varying the mix between debt and equity. That
is, capital structure is irrelevant. The stringent Modigliani-Miller conditions, however,
rarely hold; consequently, rms may require disparate forms of nance.
Many theories of capital structure, most hinging on problems of asymmetric infor-
mation and agency problems, have appeared in the past several years. In this literature,
information and preference gaps between rms (or managers) and potential investors cre-
ate dierences in the desirability of various types of nancing. Because such problems are
inherent in the use of any outside funds, recourse to external nance may raise nancing
costs. In the extreme, internally-generated funds may constitute the only viable means of
nancing new investment. Only in the presence of mechanisms able to transmit credible
information and ameliorate conicts between managers and investors is external nance
viable.
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Firms seeking outside nance must then decide between debt and equity, and that
choice is based largely on the relative costs of the two instruments. Returns on debt to
outside investors are bounded above and therefore rely less on the actions rms take.
Equity gains, in contrast, depend directly on rm valuation and thus on the quality
of managers and their investment opportunities. Moreover, rms have the incentive to
issue new equity when insiders believe shares to be overpriced. Such information problems
theoretically lead to the underpricing of equity and the rejection of worthwhile projects
by existing shareholders. Consequently, when it is dicult to determine rms' worth
(either ex ante potential or actual outcomes), debt incurs lower information-related costs
from investors and is preferred by them over equity.
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Likewise, when the potential for
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Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) address this problem, and much further research follows from that paper.
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Agency problems, as in Jensen and Meckling (1976), arise when rms are controlled by agents whose
incentives are not bound to those of owners or nanciers.
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There are now several well-known theoretical models comparing the costs of debt and equity nance.
Problems of information about opportunities motivate Myers and Majluf (1984); while diculties in ex
post monitoring and state verication inspire Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Townsend
(1979). See Harris and Raviv (1991), Hellwig (1991, 1997), and Calomiris (1993) for reviews of this and
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managerial perquisites and overinvestment is high, debt can increase managers' relative
stake in the company and reduce the availability of funds available for overinvestment.
Debt itself is a heterogenous category comprising varying degrees of maturity, liq-
uidity, collateralization, intermediation, and monitoring. A rm's options among these
alternatives are constrained by its inability to relay information credibly to securities
markets. Bank loans, because they are typically the most closely monitored mode of
nance, are usually seen as the rst step to gaining a reputation for high quality and
proper disposition of outside funds. Such monitoring is thought to alleviate asset sub-
stitution as well as under- and overinvestment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Myers, 1977,
and Stulz, 1990). Compared to bonds, however, bank debt may impose additional costs
that result from monitoring, renegotiation, and the potential for rent-extraction due to
the banks' access to proprietary information.
58
Thus, rms may avoid bank nancing
when bond-issuance is feasible.
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The pecking order hypothesis also suggests that nancing decisions may change over
the rm's lifecycle. Often, quality and availability of information grows with the devel-
opment of the rm so that rms may experience fewer information-related problems as
they become older, larger, and have possibly established track records. The fact that
reputations take time to establish suggests that mature rms face lower relative costs of
equity and often opt to reduce their exposure to xed debt payments. That is, mini-
mizing information problems reduces the cost gap between internal and external funding
and between debt and equity securities and thus alters rms' tradeos.
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Thus, seasoned
rms should tend towards more equity in their capital structure relative to immature
rms.
Financial system structure and the optimal provision of nance
The theoretical research on modes of nancing raises the possibility that the eciency of
nancial institutions may depend on the scope of their activities. Therefore, the structure
of nancial systems may aect the overall eciency of corporate nance. While there
are certainly physical costs involved in providing nance, the costs related to information
transmittal attract the most attention in recent research. Each step between saver and
investor adds costs, so institutions that minimize the number of transactions or times
information needs to be transferred should gain an advantage.
The previous section discussed the now widely-accepted theoretical proposition that
rms' nancing needs are likely to vary over time. Universal banking systems provide
related literature. See Baskin and Miranti (1997) for discussion of the historical relevance of the pecking
order hypothesis and other related theories of corporate nance.
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See Rajan (1992) on the possible monopoly rents accruing to banks due to private information about
rms.
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Diamond (1991) models the choice between monitored bank debt and directly-placed bonds. See
also Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994).
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In the Myers and Majluf model, in the absence of information problems, rms always fund investment
with equity.
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all three types of nancial claims (bank debt, bonds, and stocks) within one institution,
whereas specialized systems often distribute services across several types of intermedi-
aries. Thus, some have argued that universal banking creates economies of scope. If
information about a given rm can be reused for the provision of multiple services, uni-
versal banking will yield cost advantages over specialized systems. By similar arguments,
reputations gained in one branch of nancing may spill over into others and promote
freer entry into all nancial services.
61
Lower costs may translate into a higher volume
of nance and therefore stronger investment by industrial rms. Access to information
about the full range of nancial assets may also enable universal banks to achieve closer
to optimal diversication of investments than can specialized intermediaries.
Universal banking may also encourage the creation of long-term relationships, because
of the incentives for both bank and rm to do business with one another repeatedly.
Multi-period optimization of nancial contracting, however, may be susceptible to time-
inconsistency problems. Having received relatively cheap nance when young, a rm
may subsequently nd itself able to procure outside funds more cheaply than through its
original bank. The bank's knowledge of this possibility ex ante will discourage the bank
from providing the start-up capital. Thus, a number of explanations of creditor rela-
tionships have underscored the possible need to enforce long-term relationships through
formal institutions, such as equity stakes and bank representation on rm boards.
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Beyond its potential role in enforcing commitment between banks and rms, rela-
tionship banking may create its own advantages quite apart from universal banking.
Compared to systems in which banks do not take such active, direct roles in the rms
they nance, some have argued that relationship systems promote stronger, more ecient
investment.
Much of the theoretical work on the existence of nancial intermediaries focuses on
the need for supervision that arises due to asymmetric information between entrepreneurs
and investors. If monitoring is a crucial ingredient in intermediation, then systems that
permit close monitoring may yield advantages over those that take a less active oversight
role. The placement of bank directors on the boards of rms may facilitate the monitoring
of rms activities and outcomes; improved oversight in turn potentially benets rms in
a number of ways. Careful monitoring makes loans more secure and may enable a bank
to extend credit to rms it would otherwise ration for lack of information. Even when
information problems would not be prohibitive, oversight may substitute for collateral
and may therefore allow the bank to nance rms with apparently good projects but
with insucient collateralizable assets.
The formalized bank-rm relationships that enforce economies of scope may engender
a long-term perspective on investment programs, so that rms with bank monitors may
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Calomiris (1995) focuses on information reusability, while Rajan (1995) discusses both arguments.
See Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia (1989) on theoretical economies of scope resulting from informa-
tion reusability.
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See Mayer (1988), James and Wier (1990), Calomiris and Himmelberg (1993), and Petersen and
Rajan (1994) for theories and some evidence.
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engage in qualitatively dierent projects than they would in the absence of the relation-
ship. If investments with the highest ex post returns sometimes take longer to bear fruit,
then rms that have the leeway to make such investments may yield higher long-run
returns than those forced to pay back loans quickly. More precise pinpointing of the
causes of poor short-term performance allows remedying of under-performance without
premature liquidation of projects with high long-run value.
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Thus, relationship-based
systems may raise rms' long-run returns.
In a related vein, it is often argued that relationship banking improves the alloca-
tion of corporate control. Arms-length systems discipline management through market
mechanisms, such as mergers and take-overs. The problem with market-based systems
is that managerial failure may be dicult to detect from the outside: poor performance
alone does not conclusively imply managerial slack or incompetence. Relationship bank-
ing, in contrast, is often seen as obviating market mechanisms. As in the monitoring
of investment projects, bank oversight and control may permit quicker, more accurate
weeding out of poor managers without sacricing good managers stuck in relatively ad-
verse circumstances.
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Thus, relationship banking may further boost rm eciency and
long-term value by both minimizing unnecessary turnover and expediting benecial at-
trition.
From the perspective of securities underwriting, as well, relationship banking may
improve the eciency of nancing. Banks are thought to oer important screening
services, and close bank involvement with rm's management may create advantages
in gathering the information necessary for successful ex ante monitoring.
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Access to
information may allow more accurate valuation of share capital worth, and the good
reputation of the underwriter may increase the market for rms' shares. Formalized
bank relationships, for example through bank representation in rms' boards, may then
signal rms' quality to potential investors. Together, these eects may lower the cost of
securities issue and increase rms' access to capital markets.
These possible roles of universal, relationship banking in monitoring, signaling, and
ameliorating conicts of interest suggest that the behavior of nancial intermediaries
may also inuence the capital structure of rms. In particular, institutions that facilitate
access to rm information and coordination of diverse interests may temper the problems
that lead to inecient nancing decisions. Bank oversight may lower the relative costs
of and increase access to bank nance, so that bank-attached rms may have higher
leverage (with greater reliance on bank debt) than independent rms on average. If bank
relationships narrow information gaps and improve rms' ability to gain positive repu-
tations in capital markets, then such involvement should also reduce the cost dierential
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This idea is nearly the same as the previous, though the target of monitoring (projects or managers)
is dierent. See Stiglitz (1985) for a clear discussion of the potential shortcomings of arms-length
mechanisms for insuring shareholder value maximization.
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See, for example, Boyd and Prescott (1986) on the role of banks in channeling investment to highest
return projects.
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between debt and equity. In line with the pecking-order hypothesis, then, formal bank
relations should speed rms' movement from debt to equity nancing. Universal banks'
provision of equity underwriting and brokerage, in addition to all kinds of debt services,
should further facilitate adjustments in capital structure.
Much of the recent theoretical work deals with the problems of asymmetric infor-
mation that often exist between rms and potential investors or lenders. Relationship
banking is seen, in theory, as a means of equalizing information and resolving to the
extent possible the uncertainty that accompanies nance. Even with the best possible
information, outcomes are rarely certain. Thus, lenders and investors, as well as the rms
themselves, also face some measure of risk. An important task of any nancial system
is to manage and distribute that risk. If relationship banking enables bankers to reveal
true risks, then such practices may also improve the allocation of risk among investors.
Moreover, the fact that universal banks engage in all types of nancial transactions may
allow these institutions a greater choice of instruments through which to diversify risk.
Improved risk sharing will, theoretically, increase the economy's willingness to invest and
also reduce the costs of such investment.
A principal upshot of the theoretical literature is that the existence of nancial in-
termediaries in general can enhance both the quantity and the quality of investment in
the economy. But it may also be argued on a theoretical basis that relationship banking
further raises the quantity of funds provided to industry and may also increase both the
quality of projects undertaken and the long-term returns to investment.
Costs of universal banking and relationship banking
Not all work on universal banking supports the view that universal banking and rela-
tionship banking oer unequivocal improvements in the eciency of corporate nance.
Some have argued quite the opposite: that combining services into one institution and
allowing share-holding and interlocking directorates between banks and their clients leads
to several kinds of ineciencies.
Though there is little theoretical work on the subject, universal banking has long been
claimed to undermine the stability of the nancial system. Instability may result from
banks' equity stakes in rms{a position that exposes the banks to business downturns
and the vicissitudes of the stock markets. In addition, the combination of lending and
securities underwriting permits banks to oat loans on the assumption that future secu-
rities issues can be used for repayment. Any subsequent diculty with issuing the rms'
securities can then endanger the bank and perhaps the nancial system more generally.
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Even if universal banking does not create nancial fragility in practice, avoiding in-
stability may lead to under-investment in risky projects. Because a universal bank must
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These hypotheses are discussed in White (1986), Benston (1994), and Kroszner and Rajan (1994).
Of course, equity stakes are part of relationship banking and may be absent in a universal banking
system.
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protect depositors, it may be unable to nance high risk sectors that may oer higher re-
turns. If universal banks can prevent non-depository investment banks from entering the
market, then the system may bias investment toward conservative, low-growth sectors of
the economy.
Universal banks may also suer from conicts of interest. Such conicts may arise
because banks are able to underwrite securities for the rms to which they lend. In
situations of asymmetric information between the bank and its customers, banks may
be tempted to issue securities for distressed rms in order to liquify doubtful debts.
The bank could then sell the low-quality securities to customers. While a bank that
repeatedly issues inferior securities should theoretically lose its reputation and potentially
its business, occasional under-performing securities may not provoke ight.
Due to another form of possible conict of interest, universal banking has also been
hypothesized to discourage the development of active stock markets. Since universal
banks may trade securities and also take deposits, they may gain an advantage over
specialized stock brokers in attracting clients. Internalization of the secondary securities
trading within universal banks is detrimental to investors if markets are constrained
in size and volume or are segmented due to multiple trading centers. Universal banks'
trading of the securities they hold and underwrite may undermine the banks' incentive to
oer the optimal portfolio to investors. The fact that universal banks may hold securities
for a variety of reasons, including poor performance, undermines the signaling value of
bank equity stakes and further subverts eciency in the allocation of capital.
Two very dierent types of anti-competitive behavior may result from universal and
relationship banking, particularly in the absence of competitive markets. First, the
economies of scope that possibly motivate the combination of many services in one insti-
tution may also lead to concentration in nancial services. If concentration is excessive,
it may lead to market power, higher costs of nance, and poor service to depositors and
borrowers. Furthermore, the ability to compete in several dierent markets may facil-
itate limit pricing and enable universal banks to stave o competition from specialized
intermediaries even in segments in which the universal bank is relatively inecient.
Second, many have posited that the involvement of banks in the management of com-
panies leads to cartelization of industry. In a relationship banking system, intermediaries
may have access to important strategic information for several rms in the same sector,
and such information may permit the bank to orchestrate mergers or enforce cooperation.
These activities, while perhaps benetting some rms, may harm others and may reduce
competition and possibly consumer welfare more generally.
The eects of universal and relationship banking may create further disadvantages
for individual rms and the economy as a whole. Banks can gain proprietary information
about the rms they nance, either by providing multiple services over time or through
direct access to company boards. When rm quality is dicult to observe from the
outside, being an informed insider may permit an intermediary to extract rents in the
form of high costs of nance. In such a system, costs of switching intermediaries are
24
high, because other banks may interpret a rm's attempt to change banks as a sign that
the original bank declined to provide further funding.
67
When the market for nancial
services is not competitive, the potential costs of hold-up problems are even higher. As
a result, rms may forgo many investment programs that would be protable in a more
competitive system.
Relationship banking tends to give nancial institutions direct links to the manage-
ment of aliated companies. At the most extreme, banks own shares, take seats in rms'
boards, and exercise proxy votes for smaller share holders. While such insight may be
seen as benecial to companies in need of entrepreneurial expertise, explicit control over
investment decisions and rm strategy may not benet all rms or all outside investors.
For banker inuence in rm decisions to be benecial, bankers must both know better
than industrialists what would be the optimal choices to make and have similar enough
incentives to those of the rms to see that the best decision is implemented. Equity
stakes are one way to align the incentives of the bank with those of the rm and its other
shareholders.
At least in the German system, however, banks are permitted to exercise proxy votes
and take positions in rms' boards even in the absence of share ownership. Control
without any ownership, when banks also hold rms' debt, may lead to excessive conser-
vatism. The banks' desire for future commission business may mitigate these problems
both directly and indirectly. Assuming that the bank will have a signicant part in future
issues, the fact that rms are more likely to issue new securities when they are growing
and investing may restore the banks' incentive to take risks. Furthermore, the banks'
need to maintain a good reputation with proxy owners may, in a sense, force the bank to
internalize shareholders' preferences. Yet these kinds of guarantees only work perfectly
in the absence of information problems and in the presence of competition. Asymmetric
information, especially when the bank sector has monopoly power, may permit banks to
subjugate small shareholders' interests to the banks' interests as debt-holders. Further-
more, commissions on share trading and issuing may be secondary relative to those on
debt and to the value of guaranteeing debt repayment. Thus, proxy voting and equity
ownership may not provide equivalent incentives.
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Clearly, the literature on universal banking oers much theoretical fodder on the
micro-level eects of nancial system structure. The organization of nancial institu-
tions may partly determine the extent of competition among nancial intermediaries,
the quantity of nancial capital drawn into the nancial system, and the distribution of
that capital to ultimate uses. The choice between universal and specialized banking may
aect interest rates, underwriting costs, and the eciency of secondary markets in secu-
rities. Furthermore, the existence or non-existence of relationship banking may aect the
quality of investments undertaken, strategic decision-making, and even the competitive-
ness of industry. There are then two levels at which the nancial system can inuence
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the costs of nance: general eects on the economy as a whole and localized inuences
on individual rms and industries. At both levels, the structure of the nancial system
may have substantial inuence on the real economy.
C. Financial structure and economic growth
Given that nancial institutions' eciency may vary depending on their structure, it is
reasonable to wonder whether the real eects of nancial systems vary as a result. The
idea that nancial institutions can actively promote growth is quite old. Schumpeter
(1912), for example, suggested that bankers, through their selection and funding of en-
trepreneurs, promote innovative activity and spur economic growth. The literature on
economic growth has begun to grapple with this question, and progress in such research
may help in understanding whether certain types of nancial systems promote higher
rates of growth and greater welfare than others.
The question of causality remains a problem in the theoretical literature, though
recent work is beginning to oer models in which inuences run in both directions.
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Greenwood and Smith (1997) and Boyd and Smith (1996) oer a reasonable compromise:
models in which nancial markets arise after some period of real development, and the
expansion of those markets fuels further real growth. A logical implication of these
models is that exogenous creation of a nancial system with advanced features may not
spur real growth.
These latter two models also begin to deal with the question of the ramications
of nancial system structure. Greenwood and Smith (1997) provide a rst step toward
thinking about such distinctions; showing that growth rates obtained in economies with
either banks or equity markets exceed those of economies without nancial intermediaries.
Though most of the literature oers no comparison of the relative benets of dierent
types of nancial systems, the Greenwood and Smith (1997) model shows that, with
sucient risk aversion on the part of the investing public, equity markets produce stronger
growth than do banks. In a series of papers, Boyd and Smith (1994a, 1995, 1996)
introduce the changing roles of debt and equity in the development process and show
that, though stock markets should develop after a period of intermediary dominance,
both debt and equity remain viable and complementary sources of nance.
Still, these models do not dierentiate between universal and specialized banking and
the possibly dierent outcomes such systems promote. Variation in growth eects may
be inferred from some other recent work. King and Levine (1993), for example, formalize
the Schumpeterian view into the framework of an endogenous growth model. In their
model, the nancial system aects productivity growth through four channels: screen-
ing prospective entrepreneurs in order to select the most promising projects, mobilizing
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The more recent literature considering the causal relationship between 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King and Levine (1993), Japelli and Pagano (1993), Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), and Rajan and Zin-
gales (1997). Lucas (1988), perhaps not surprisingly, expresses doubt about the importance of 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capital to fund investments, diversifying investors' portfolios to eliminate risk, and reveal-
ing the potential benets of participating in productivity-enhancing activities.
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Thakor
(1996), who is explicitly concerned with the question of nancial system design, lays
out six partially-overlapping links between the nancial system and the real economy:
screening by banks, credit rationing by banks, liquidity transformation and bank runs,
loan commitments by banks, debt restructuring, and the feedback role of nancial mar-
kets. In general, nancial institutions may enhance economic growth by raising the total
quantity of nancial capital available to entrepreneurs, improving the quality (productiv-
ity) of investments, and increasing the eciency of intermediation between the sources
and uses of funds. Thus, the structure of nancial systems may inuence real variables,
since dierent institutions may handle these tasks with varying eciency.
While it is clear that nancial systems vary in their real eects, it is not yet clear
what kind of system oers the greatest net benet to the real economy. Research so far
suggests that there are tradeos between banks and nancial markets in the revelation
and transmission of information necessary for making optimal real decisions; the desir-
ability of one system over another depends on the context. Allen (1992) reasons that,
because markets aggregate information from a wide range of disparate sources, but banks
depend primarily on their own assessments, markets dominate banks when technologies
are new, complex, or rapidly evolving. Banks prevail when technologies are clearly un-
derstandable and optimal investment decisions are easy to make. Also, as Thakor (1996)
argues, bank-dominated systems exacerbate eort-aversion and overinvestment, while
market-based systems lead to excessive reliance on borrower reputation as well as greater
asset-substitution moral hazard.
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Furthermore, the analyses of von Thadden (1990) and
Dewatripont and Maskin (1990) suggest that banks tend to prolong low-quality projects
for too long, while markets often liquidate good projects prematurely. All of these prob-
lems can lead to sub-optimal investment decisions and lower real economic growth.
This literature, however, tends to focus on the dierence between banks and stock
markets in the allocation of investment capital and not on the eects of various banking
structures.
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This tendency arises because of the perception that universal, relationship-
based banks dominate the nancial systems in which they operate, and that nancial
markets dominate in systems in which nancial intermediaries are specialized. Much of
the variation in nancial system structure, however, results from peculiarities of nancial
system regulation. Thus, it is still unclear whether universal banking in itself constrains
the development of nancial markets, or if government intervention in the cases so far
studied simultaneously promoted banks and hindered securities markets. Likewise, it is
dicult to tell whether limitations on bank operations spur nancial market development,
or if something else about the American and British economies or societies has led to
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Papers by Crane (1995) and Peters and Thakor (1995) show that variation in information availabil-
ity and in incentives to monitor (both banks and borrowers) recommend functional separation between
insured, deposit-nanced banks to nance projects that require no monitoring and uninsured interme-
diaries to invest in projects associated with private information and a need for monitoring.
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market-oriented nancial systems.
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So far, theoretical research has not rationalized the
endogenous development of distinct nancial system designs and their persistence in the
absence of regulation. Answers to such puzzles may hinge both on making advances in
theoretical modeling and on assembling a wider range of empirical evidence.
IV. REASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF
FINANCIAL SYSTEM STRUCTURE
Even after several decades of debates over the power, scope, and timing of universal
banking in Germany, questions remain about the validity of the orthodox view of banking
and industrialization. Moreover, recent advances in the theoretical literature on nancial
intermediation suggest new questions and areas of empirical research.
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At the same
time, much theoretical work on universal banking is motivated by widely-held views on
the organization and operations of the German universal banks, many of which may be
only partly true. Thus, in order to derive useful theoretical models and apply them to
the historical record, it is necessary to have a broad and accurate understanding of past
experiences.
It would be dicult to argue that in no country has the nancial system played a role
in economic growth and the development of industry. If nothing else, banks and capital
markets play central parts in the mobilization of resources. Yet the optimal structure of
nancial intermediaries is a separate question. Most economists and economic historians
believe that the German universal banks were and are fundamentally dierent from their
counterparts in the UK and the US. Thus, the question that still needs to be asked is
whether the universal banking system per se was either necessary or sucient for the
industrialization of Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century and up to
World War I.
Claiming that the universal banks were critical to the German industrialization can
mean several things. In the most fundamental sense, it means that something the uni-
versal banks did was necessary for industrialization and could not have been provided by
other types of institutions. The universal banks could be seen as crucial for industrial-
ization either through their nancial and political power alone or because of some eect
of their institutional structure. In other words, in order to determine whether universal
banking is uniquely suited to promote growth, one must be able to show that certain fea-
tures of this particular system of nance are needed for the provision of sucient capital
to industry. In much of the literature, the connection between the banks' structure and
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industrial development, however, remains fairly loose; and the more recent debates over
the timing of industrialization and the development of the nancial system persist.
Thus, the rst item on a research agenda should be a reassessment of the development
of the German nancial system and its relation to industrial change and growth. The
rst step in such an investigation is to evaluate the pattern of growth of the universal
system as a whole. In particular, we need to determine when the characteristics that we
now think of as central to universal banking arose, if at all. Three such features come
immediately to mind: deposit taking and branching, bank representation on rm boards,
and bank ownership of industry equity stakes.
The common perception is that universal banks gathered \large amounts of capital
through the deposit of savings throughout the country..."
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The combination of a broad
and diversied base of deposits, and the existence of a dependable lender of last resort
(the Prussian Bank and then the Reichsbank), are seen as key to the mobilization of
major nancial capital for long-term investment. The problem with this characterization,
however, is that the universal banks' deposit business only became signicant in the
1890s, and regional diversication only came thereafter.
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Before that, and especially
before 1870, the universal banks depended on the issue of new equity capital to expand
the supply of nance. The takeo in the total assets of the universal banks overall
coincides with the onset of the serious deposit business and the industrial boom starting
around 1894{a point by which industrial enterprises could fund a signicant share of
investment out of retained earnings.
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A similar anachronism surrounds the representation of German banks on industrial
rms' supervisory boards and the broader practice of interlocking directorates between
and among banks and rms. Such formalized relationships, because they depend on
the presence of a supervisory board, could only develop after the joint-stock corpora-
tion became widespread (after 1870). Furthermore, gaining board representation was
probably only generally desirable after the strengthening of supervisory boards in the
1884 company law.
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Yet interlocking directorates appear to have become common only
in the 1890s; long after the onset of industrialization and after many rms attained -
nancial substantial self- suciency.
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Moreover, interlocking directorates of the largest
banks encompassed only about 12 percent of all joint-stock rms even at the peak of the
later stage of industrialization (1904-5).
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Since joint-stock rms represent a minority of
German companies, the percentage of all rms with formal bank relationships must be
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markedly lower. As a result, the general signicance of interlocking directorates is likely
overemphasized in the standard view of the German system and its role in industrializa-
tion.
For inuencing the quality of investment, the crucial organizational advantage of the
German banks is their supposed long-term participation in industrial rms. By holding
industrial shares, and thereby getting themselves onto supervisory boards, the banks are
thought to have monitored and even controlled the rms they nanced. While most would
acknowledge that the German banks did not voluntarily hold large shares in industrial
rms, there is a general view that the banks typically held a small stake in rms that the
banks desired to inuence.
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Since evidence on equity ownership is generally unavailable
for German companies prior to World War I, it is dicult to determine exact share
holdings by banks. Nonetheless, the evidence available indicates that particularly in the
1870-1914 period, equity stakes were very limited in number and amounted to a small
percentage of banks' assets overall. Indeed, the Darmstadter Bank reported holdings
of only 10 rms over the whole period 1882-1896 and no more than 7 rms in any one
year.
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Thus, the traditional notion of bank shareholdings also seems not to match the
actual historical record for Germany, at least not before the rst world war.
Clearly, banks gained signicant proxy rights for shares they held on deposit from
customers; yet this practice, combined with the banks' predominant status as debt-
holders, suggests scope for conicts of interest rather than benecial oversight. That is,
banks may use their control of equity stakes to further their interests as debt holders.
While theoretical models could be composed, in which the need to maintain reputations
forces the banks to act in equity-holders' interest, it is likely that the banks would be in
an advantageous position with respect to small shareholders. And the results of acting in
the interest of debt-holders|primarily excessive conservatism|may be dicult to detect
in a portfolio of shares. Although the empirical evidence on this question is scant, the
ndings so far available suggest that rms with bank board members invested at similar
rates on average, but received lower prots and rates of return than those independent
of bank inuence.
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In general, it appears that a number of characteristics closely identied with German
universal banking developed late in the industrialization process and sometimes failed to
materialize to the extent supposed in the strict Gerschenkronian paradigm. Furthermore,
even once the characteristics of the universal banking system became established, it
is clear that the banks' inuence was unevenly distributed. Regional variation in the
nancial system and the relationship of such dierences to the industrial, political, and
even social characteristics of regions are therefore of signicant interest.
Tipton prefaced his work on regional variation by saying that, \...in Germany tra-
ditional values, social structure, and the distribution of political power appear to have
81
References to equity stakes appear in Riesser (1910), Calomiris (1995), and Zamagni (1993).
82
See Fohlin (1997c, 1997e) for detailed evidence on two of the Berlin banks and general evidence on
universal banks as a group. These papers also discusses the relevant theoretical literature.
83
Tilly (1994) and Fohlin (1998b).
30
played crucial roles in the specic course of each region's development and in some in-
stances explain why economic opportunities could be seized in one region and not in
another."
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This point is eshed out well in Herrigel (1996) on the basis of a wide survey
of research on individual regions of Germany. He argues that regions that began the
nineteenth century with a small-scale traditional industrial base (in specialized metal
working and textiles, for example) continued to develop along such lines even as the
more backward regions grew in the Gerschenkronian or Chandlerian style of large-scale
business and organized capitalism. Whatever the true cause of regional variation, it
clearly persisted in Germany throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Interestingly, the decentralized regions, having begun to industrialize already in the 18th
century, may look more like parts of Britain than the rest of Germany.
The universal banks, as is now well known, were absent from signicant portions
of the German economy before World War I, but that does not necessarily mean that
such sectors gained no access to nancial institutions. In many regions, credit coopera-
tives provided the primary source of nancial intermediation and mobilized small-scale
resources that would otherwise remain idle. Because they nearly always formed in small
towns with close-knit communities, they were able to screen potential members, monitor
outcomes, and enforce repayment with relatively low costs. Though these institutions
never accounted for a large share of total nancial system assets, their sheer numbers
(17,000 in 1909) gave them an important part in the economy, especially in certain lo-
cales. The cooperative system largely remained separate from the industrial banks, but
through central institutions for pooling and distributing excess funds, the cooperatives
also tapped into the universal banking system.
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Although the banks, including non-universal banks, comprise the dominant segment
of the nancial system, it is important also to investigate the development or the lack
of development of the German securities markets. Issues of new German empire joint-
stock company securities amounted to 28 percent of British empire securities in 1910,
and domestic (non-government) securities amounted to a far smaller percentage of total
assets in Germany than in Great Britain, Belgium, France, and the U.S. throughout the
1850-1913 period.
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Nonetheless, in 1905 German stock exchanges listed nearly 2,000
German companies, or 36 percent of all joint-stock rms. Half of these rms were listed
in Berlin.
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The extent of secondary securities markets is linked both to the structure of the
universal banks and to regulations on the nancial system. Universal banks' equity stakes,
proxy votes, and supervisory board positions in industrial rms likely arose primarily out
of the banks' involvement in underwriting and brokerage services; and much trading of
securities apparently owed through the banks. Thus, the universal banks, whose leaders
also partly controlled the reins of the exchanges, internalized much secondary trading of
securities. Incorporation and listing requirements in Germany seem to have necessitated
investment banks or groups of investment banks large enough to underwrite the entire
capital of new issues and with sucient contacts to place the underwritten shares.
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In addition, transactions taxes, as well as other regulations imposed in the 1896 law,
encouraged trading outside of the exchanges and advantaged the large, Berlin banks at
the expense of the provincial universal banks. As Riesser (1910, 1911) noted soon after,
the new law also contributed to the concentration in German banking. Thus, it seems
that the regulation simultaneously encouraged the growth of large-scale universal banking
in Germany and inhibited the development of securities markets. The historical record
may therefore show that universal systems do not generally inhibit the growth of capital
markets; but the compatibility of the two types of institutions is also not yet established.
Some recent work, such as Schulz (1994) and Tilly (1995), has begun to quantify the
eects of legal changes on the structure of the German system, yet further work is clearly
needed on this front especially if comprehensive comparisons of the German nancial
system with those of such heavily market-oriented systems as Britain and the United
States is a goal.
Once the development of the German system is understood, the impact of those
institutions should be analyzed at the microeconomic level. First, it is necessary to
determine whether universal banking per se advantaged German rms and the economy
as a whole. Answering this larger question may require settling several subsidiary issues,
and the theoretical work discussed previously provides a useful framework for such an
investigation.
The primary theoretical advantage of universal banking is economies of scope. That
is, the combination of services within a single institution is thought to lead to greater
eciency and lower nancing costs than can be achieved when separate institutions pro-
vide dierent, but related, nancial services. Accurate measurement, however, presents
a signicant challenge in establishing a cost advantage. Unlike specialized investment
and commercial banks, universal banks may be able to manipulate prices in order to
earn extra-normal prots on some products while maintaining competitive levels on oth-
ers. Thus, in measuring the relative costs of two systems, it is important to consider all
sources of nance. In practice, however, it is dicult to establish and nd data on the
relevant costs and prices for comparable time periods. For example, the same Calomiris
(1995) paper cited previously makes a strong theoretical case for economies of scope, and
attempts to compare underwriting spreads charged on initial public oerings in Germany
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For example, after the company law of 1884, companies were required to have fully paid up share
capital before beginning operations. On this law, see Hommelhof and Schubert (1984). On the 1896 law
see Meier (1992).
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and the United States. Yet the evidence there (and additional evidence provided in Tilly,
1994) is scant and dicult to interpret.
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Even if economies of scope exist, cost savings are likely to depend on the extent
of competition in banking. In the absence of perfect competition, economies of scope
may be reected in higher bank protability rather than lower prices; though imperfect
markets may permit bank managers to dissipate rents or hide prots. Thus, eciency
gains may be meager or fail to materialize at all. In contradiction of the economies
of scope argument, recent research nds that Japanese rms with bank relationships
actually face higher costs of capital than those without.
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Furthermore, size dierences,
and thus economies of scale (not scope), may account for cost savings as well. Thus, size
must be controlled for in cost comparisons.
The conclusion has to be that more evidence on the industrial organization of the
banking sector, and its eects on eciency, is in order for the German case.
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Alter-
native implications of such eciency should also be sought. One possibility is rms'
investment patterns. If universal banking does indeed reduce overall nancing costs rel-
ative to separated systems, then increased levels of industrial investment may result if
such investment depends on external nance, and if demand for nancing is sensitive to
its cost. All else equal, more projects should be worth funding in systems with lower
costs.
Others have also argued that universal banking improves the allocation of investment
in the economy as a whole. In one of the few quantitative, theoretically-based investiga-
tions of the eects of the German banking system, Tilly (1986) argues that, \nancial
institutions inuence economic development mainly through the provision of opportuni-
ties for wealthholders to diversify their portfolios and the related stimulus to the supply
of risk- bearing capital."
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While there is a fairly loose theoretical connection here, the
hypothesis seems to be that universal banks oer superior diversication potential, both
because of the range of nancial services they provide, and due to their advantages over
specialized systems in the acquisition of information. As noted previously, Kennedy and
Britton (1985) and Tilly (1986) nd support for this argument. Given the diculty in
measuring the required variables, the small sample sizes, and the heroic assumptions
required to implement the theory (such as competitive markets, homogeneous risk pref-
erences, symmetric information, and zero transactions costs), it is dicult to draw strong
conclusions from the existing evidence. Perhaps more fundamental, though, is the prob-
lem of assigning credit for the diversication of the whole economy to the universal banks
in the rst place, and to the structure of those institutions in the second.
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Several studies of economies of scope in American banking, most of which nd meager gains at best,
are discussed in Calomiris (1995) as well as in Rajan (1995).
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Weinstein and Yafeh (1995).
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An example of such work is Grossman's (1997) paper on competition and eciency in British banking
in the pre-World War I era.
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Tilly (1986), p. 115.
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As the theoretical discussion pointed out, universal banking, though not always tied
to relationship banking, is thought to lead to long-term relationships between banks and
rms. Formalization of those relationships, usually through share ownership and board
membership, is seen as an important means of overcoming time inconsistency problems
and enforcing repeated interaction. Interlocking directorates are also hypothesized to
allow banks to carefully monitor the rms to which they lend. Moreover, formalized
bank relationships are characterized as mechanisms for enforcing rationalization such
as cooperative agreements, mergers, and acquisitions in industry. In short, interlocking
directorates are seen as the key to the activist role of universal banks during the German
industrialization.
Given the theoretical importance of interlocking directorates, rms engaged in such
relationships should receive greater attention from banks, should experience fewer prob-
lems of asymmetric information, should be rationed less, and should encounter lower
costs of nance than those in similar economic positions but without close bank involve-
ment. Thus, even within a given economy, the eciency of nance and resulting rates
of investment should vary substantially across rms. From the monitoring perspective,
bank relationships may be particularly important for young rms as well as those with
insucient collateral, high ratios of debt to equity, or relatively long gestation periods
before returns appear.
Despite the cogency of the theoretical scenarios, however, and their consonance with
orthodox historical views, recent research has begun to cast doubt on such interpretations.
Especially notable is the nding that, controlling for a broad range of rm characteristics,
high rates of investment are not associated with bank representation on rms' supervisory
boards. In addition, other rm characteristics expected to be associated with involve-
ment in interlocking directorates, for example, debt-equity ratios, protability, and rm
age, fail to emerge as signicant predictors of bank aliation. Indeed, the strongest in-
dicator of interlocking directorates is listing on a stock exchange. Moreover, formal bank
oversight does not increase access to bank debt and seems, if anything, to slow rms'
movement through the nancial pecking order.
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The theoretical literature is widely interpreted as implying that bank relationships
should ease nancing constraints. Evidence on rms' liquidity constraints, however, is
plagued by methodological debates and is, in any case, mixed. Historical studies of
Germany and Italy show that investment was no less sensitive to rms' liquidity, and
in some cases was more sensitive, for bank-aliated companies than for those without
formal bank connections; yet one study of German mining rms nds the opposite.
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See Fohlin (1997b) on assessing the motivations for interlocking directorates and Fohlin (1998c) on
bank oversight and rm capital structure. The lack of bank records for the pre-World War I era hinders
investigation of the collateral taken on loans to rms.
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Both Fohlin (1998b) on German rms in the decade before World War I and Fohlin (1998a) on Italy
during the same period nd investment to be related to rms' liquidity. The former discusses poten-
tial methodological problems, especially the potential bias induced by the selection of rms into bank
relationships. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) present a critique of linear models of investment sensitivity
contained in the heavily-cited work of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988). Becht and Ramirez (1993)
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Moreover, modern empirical studies also come to contradictory conclusions; some nd-
ing large decreases in bank-attached rms' liquidity sensitivity, and others nding the
opposite.
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More conclusive evidence is needed and likely hinges on gathering larger sam-
ples and improving the methods for discerning liquidity constraints and rationing and
for controlling the eects of selection bias.
The theoretical section discussed two further outgrowths of bank relationships, bet-
ter screening of rms and improved corporate control, that historical research hardly
discusses. The latter hypothesis, that bank oversight minimizes unnecessary turnover
while weeding out bad managers quickly, is appealing. However, for the same reasons
that outsiders at the time would be unable to discern accurately between bad managers
in good circumstances and good managers in bad circumstances, the corporate control
hypothesis is dicult to test empirically. Similarly, the seal of approval argument also
makes sense, but it is hard to know what private information banks had that investors
could not access or evaluate themselves.
On both counts, however, indirect evidence may oer insights. In particular, both
theories suggest that rms with formal bank involvement should have higher long-run
rates of return than rms without. Perhaps more broadly, the theories suggest that rms
in relationship banking systems should experience higher rates of return than rms in
market-based systems. In addition, rms who have been screened should have greater
access to outside debt and equity and, all else equal, should therefore invest and grow
more. The little existing rm-level evidence is not very supportive of these hypotheses:
bank board membership is not associated with higher investment and is, according to
Rettig (1978) and Tilly (1994), negatively associated with rates of return.
96
Empirical research cannot end with evaluating the benets of universal and relation-
ship banking. Indeed, if future work continues to cast doubt on the traditional view of the
advantages of the German-style nancial system, then investigating the disadvantages is
even more crucial. Opponents of universal banking and formal bank attachments have
long argued that such arrangements lead to instability, conicts of interest, and anti-
competitive behavior. Though empirical work on Germany and the U.S. has tended to
reject such notions, a more subtle result of such problems largely has been ignored. That
is, the potential for instability and conicts of interest, and the existence of hold-up
problems due to bank control, may lead to conservatism on the part of banks or rms.
Such inhibition may cause underinvestment; and the problem may be the worst for rms
nd, in a very small sample of German mining rms, that bank-aliated companies experience lower
investment cash-ow sensitivity than independent rms.
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See Elston (1997), Chirinko (1997), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990), and an unpublished
study by Hall and Weinstein discussed in Hellwig (1997).
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The ndings on rates of return raise another logical inconsistency: if the banks were important
because they took risks in nancing promising new technologies, then they should have received higher
long-run returns than they would have nancing safe projects. Their ability to diversify portfolios and
should not have reduced rates of return below safer projects. There is so far little quantitative evidence
about the risk associated with the bank-aliated companies, but on the basis of returns, investors
seemingly would have done consistently better by investing in a portfolio of rms without bankers on
their boards than with.
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with formal bank involvement. These considerations suggest that positive eects on
investment discussed previously may be at least partially oset.
Virtually all of the theories relating to interlocking directorates and economies of scope
lead to conclusions about rms' investment patterns. These outcomes naturally inuence
the rms that are directly involved, but they may also translate into advantages at the
macroeconomic level. The rm-level evidence thus far available, however, is mixed. Thus,
establishing the investment patterns of rms with and without bank involvement presents
perhaps the primary challenge in evaluating the eects of nancial system structure.
It is dicult to re-evaluate the evolution and impact of the German nancial system
in isolation; and, in any case, modern debates over banking deregulation in the United
States, like historical debates over the alleged failures of the British banking systems, fun-
damentally imply a comparison between universal, relationship banking and specialized,
arms-length systems. Thus, comparisons with other countries, both with and without
universal banking systems, can help in placing the German experience in context while
shedding light on the relative costs and benets of dierent institutional structures. Re-
search into this question must begin by establishing what constitutes proof that one
system dominates the other. It is also essential to consider the possibility that nancial
institutions are tied to the political, legal, social, and cultural systems in which they exist
and are therefore highly context sensitive.
The goal, from an historical perspective, is to determine whether countries with sep-
arated systems would have benetted from universal and relationship banking and also
whether countries that did import German-style banking did benet. Two natural can-
didates for comparison are Britain and Italy. For the former, where the contrast with
the German system is seen as the most stark, new comparisons of the growth and in-
volvement of banks are particularly important. Bringing together the latest thinking on
the British and German systems may turn up more similarities than dierences in the
ultimate eects of these systems. Recent research on British banks, for example, suggests
that British banks played a more active and long-term role in industrial investment than
has traditionally been believed and that German banks were less involved in direct equity
participations in rms than the orthodox view holds.
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Likewise, newer work on Italy argues for a moderate interpretation of the role of
the universal banks in that country's industrialization.
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If orthodox views of universal
banking are undermined similarly in two of the paradigm cases, and if the stark dieren-
tiation with the British system is softened, then the more general view of the importance
of universal banking per se in spurring economic growth will be signicantly qualied.
Such ndings, however, are not necessarily antithetical to Gerschenkron's hypothe-
ses. Gerschenkron's thesis does not imply that universal, relationship banking is always
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On the involvement of British bankers in industry see Capie and Collins (1992), Collins (1998),
Cottrell (1980), Mathias (1973, 1989). See Fohlin (1997c) for a quantitative comparison of the British
and German systems.
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See Confalonieri (1979, 1981) and Fohlin (1998a).
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a superior system to specialized, arms-length systems. Indeed, in this view, the German
style of nancial intermediation developed as a response to shortcomings elsewhere in
the economy particularly, a shortage of accumulated surpluses from previous years' pro-
duction. Thus, universal banking may have been a second-best solution in cases in which
the rst-best was unattainable. An interesting implication of Gerschenkron's hypothesis
about banking and relative backwardness is that economies that have developed fully can
reduce their reliance on the institutions that developed to push industrialization. Thus,
the characteristics of the German banks that are seen as so central to that country's
industrialization should have become less important once Germany caught up to Britain
after the turn of the twentieth century. In a sense, the German nancial system should
have become more similar to the British system once the two economies were on par in
other respects. Here again, political and legal factors seem to play a crucial role.
Whether or not universal, relationship banking is especially suited to stimulate growth
during industrialization, such a system may outlive its usefulness. Institutional sclero-
sis, however, may prevent adaptation to changes in the economy. From the historical
accounts of universal banking's role in Germany, it is clear that economies of scale (and
thus growing concentration) in the frontier industries of the late nineteenth century are
linked closely to the structure of the nancial system of that country. But if the long-
term development of an economy is not linked to a particular industrial structure, and
if nancial institutions tend to become fossilized, then the net real eects of nancial
systems may vary over time. As Tilly notes, \...during [the interwar period], and par-
ticularly in the crisis of the 1930s, the superiority of the universal banking system as a
means of nancing industrial growth disappears."
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The fact that the German and British systems did not converge should lead researchers
to wonder whether the Gerschenkron hypothesis helps us understand the role of univer-
sal banking in Germany or the possible role of similar institutions in modern economies.
If there are signicant long-term eects of the structure of nancial systems, then the
persistence of multiple systems needs to be rationalized. The fact that, in the absence of
regulation dictating the form of nancial institutions, Germany and Britain retain appar-
ently dierent systems, suggests that the costs of switching are too high, that the welfare
eects are not internalized by the institutions involved, or that the eects of institu-
tional structure are small. Thus, even in the face of prolic research comparing nancial
systems, the possibility also must be considered that the systems are equivalent at a
rst-order approximation. We may nd that the crucial condition for economic growth
is the existence of some mechanism to mobilize resources for productive investment.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Gerschenkron himself recognized that he could not answer the broader question, whether
nancial institutions are generally able to promote the kind of mobilization and ecient
utilization of capital that is thought of as a prerequisite for industrial development.
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Tilly (1994), p. 5. Of course, this comment presupposes the superiority of the German system in
the pre-war era.
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Only recently has the economics literature made major progress on such questions, and
much attention is focused on the importance of nancial system design. At the same
time, recent historical research oers mixed evidence on the potential benets, and little
insight into the costs, of universal banking systems.
In this light, the current paper argues that orthodox views of the importance of
nancial structure, and of the benets of the universal, relationship system of banking in
particular, require rethinking. As the primary example of the Gerschenkron hypothesis,
Germany is of central signicance. If the specic institutions that comprise universal and
relationship banking cannot be shown to have resulted in higher quantities, productivity,
or eciency of investment at the rm level, then we are left to determine what other
factors played a part in transforming Germany into a modern, industrial nation.
Despite substantial recent progress in understanding problems of nancial system
structure, we still need a combination of research on both the theoretical and empirical
fronts: new evidence and re-evaluations of extant sources in order to better understand
the development and role of nancial systems, as well as theoretical advances that take
into account the revised empirical record. In this regard, historical research is particu-
larly important. First, much of the current structure of nancial institutions originates
in the institutions and systems of the nineteenth century. Understanding the past may
therefore enrich our understanding of the present. Second, since each economic epoch
presents dierent challenges for nancial systems and economies, adding periods essen-
tially increases the number of data points available. A broader range of cases permits
greater generalization.
In addition, if empirical research more broadly fails to support current theoretical
thinking, then a clearer understanding of the reasons for that failure is also needed.
Thus, existing theories may require some adjustment if they are to prove useful for turn-
ing empirical research into forecasts or prescriptions. Neither theoretical nor historical
research is motivated solely by the desire to oer practical insights into modern problems,
but this paper argues that both strands of literature will benet from increased inuence
of the other.
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